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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BETTY LsSOURD, a woman, ALEX, 
T. DAVIES and THELMA DAVIES, 
his wife, and VALLEY BANK & 
TRUST COMP ANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12471 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
All italics are ours and are added for emphasis. The 
parties will be referred to as in the Trial Court. "R" re-
fers to Record and "T .R." refers to Transcript of Rec-
ord in original proceedings and "S.R." refers to Sup-
plemental Record. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in eminent domain, brought by the 
1 
State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission, to 
acquire certain land owned by the defendants for high. I 
way purposes. The matter was tried to the Trial Court 
on the issues of fair market value for the property taken I 
by the State of Utah and the amount of damage, if any, 
to the remainder. The Court entered judgment for the 
defendant landowners in the sum of $65,990.00 predi-
cated upon a judcial determination that the said defend- j 
ants were, at the time of the institution of said action and / 
the date of taking, the owners of 6.27 acres from which I 
l 
.42 acre was expropriated in fee. The plaintiff appealed I 
from said Judgment and Decree in case # 11866, and on ~ 
July 23, 1970, this Court entered its Decision as reported 
in 24 Utah 2d 383, 472 P.2d 939. The Trial Court there· 
after entered Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree, from which plaintiff takes this ap· 
peal. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
' 
Civil action Nos. 37 53 and 3736 in the District i 
Court of Summit County, State of Utah, were consoli· :i 
d
, I 
dated for purposes of trial; and the Trial Court, pre I· ' 
cated upon a determination that the defendant land own· 1 
ers were at the date of taking, the owners of 6.27 acres 1 
' ~ of real property, entered Judgment in favor of the sai 'i 
defendant land owners in the sum of $65,990.00. The . 
plaintiff appealed said Judgment to the Supreme Court ' 
of this State under case No. 11866, contending that the ' 
i 
2 
Trial Court had erred in its determination of ownership 
of the property and had made an erroneous assessment 
of severance damages based upon land which the said 
defendant land owners did not own as of the date of tak-
ing. This Court by Decision of July 23, 1970, decreed 
that the defendant landowners were not the owners in 
fee of a portion of the property of land in their posses-
sion and reversed the case with directions to the trial 
judge to eliminate from his Findings and Judgment all 
severance damages awarded for the "non-owned land," 
and further directed that if the said trial judge could 
not eliminate such from his findings and judgment, that 
anew trial should be ordered. Thereafter, the trial judge, 
after argument of counsel and deliberation, entered a 
Memorandum Decision dated January 25, 1971, con-
cluding that $5,800.00 was the amount awarded for sev-
erance damage to the "non-owned land," and after de-
, ducting the same from the total judgment of $65,990.00, 
directed that judgment be entered for the defendant 
landowners in the sum of $60,192.00 and, that Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment be 
entered in accordance with said Decision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Amended J udg-
, ment based upon Amended Findings of Fact Nos. 3, 4, 
' 6, 7, 8, 9, and IO and Amended Conclusions of Law No. 
3, and asks that a new trial be ordered, or, in the alterna-
3 
tive, that the Court order entry of Judgment in favor ol 
defendants based upon the evidence of plainiff' s witness, 
Gregory Austin. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
Insofar as relevant to the issues before this court, 
the plaintiff instituted two separate actions to expropri· 
ate lands for highway purposes near the intersection o! 
U.S. highway 40 and highway U-248 in Summit County, 
Utah, as more fully set forth in the Complaints identi· 
fied as Civil Nos. 37 53 and 3736. 
Defendants were the owners of l.33 acres on the 
date of taking, i.e., September 12, 1967,, a portion of 
which comprising .37 acre was taken in fee for highway 
construction, leaving .96 acre remainder. (Amended 
Findings of Fact No. 2.) 
On the date of taking, a business consisting of a 
garage, servic estation, cafe and small cabins was being 
conducted upon the I.33 acres and adjoining "non-owned 
land." (T.R. 388, 508, 585, 586; S.R. 11; Def. Exhibit 
#31; T.R. 118, 120, 121, 122, Exhibit D-1.) 
Preliminary to hearing the issues of damages and 
compensation, the Trial Court, after extensive testimon)' 
and evidence, ruled as a matter of law, that the defend· 
ants were the owners of 6.27 acres at the time of and 
prior to condemnation; that 5.85 acres remained after 
4 
taking, and that .42 acre had been expropriated. (T.R. 
266, 267.) 
Based upon said ruling, expert witnesses predicated 
their testimony of values and damages and produced 
evidence based upon such ruling. (T.R. 381, 419, 422, 
499, 508, 515, 571, 578, 602, 604, Def. Exhibit 31.) 
I (T.R. 631, 661, 666, 667.) 
The defendant landowners produced three land 
valuation witnesses who testified extensively as to com-
pensation for the taking and damages to the remainder, 
and the plaintiff produced one expert witness who testi-
1 fied on such issues. All witnesses utilized the before and 
ii after approach. 
rl 
], 
' 
The significant testimony of each such witness is as 
follows: 
Witnesses for defendant landowners: 
I. Marcellus Palmer: 
"Q. How many acres did this property comprise, 
which you appraised? 
A. There's 6.27 acres." (T.R. 381.) * * * 
Q. All right. Now, the reasonable market value you 
1
, have put here as $25,000.00. 'Vhich property did you 
find was reasonably worth $25,000.00 out of this total 
area here, that you capitalized? 
A. It was approximately a two acre tract, that takes 
5 
i 
in the buildings and improvements." (T.R. 392, 393.)I 
*** 
"Q. You found then-you found that the, under 
your testimony, that the value of the land under the in. 
come approach was $44,215.00. Tell the Court how you 
arrived at that $44,215.00. 
A. That was arrived at this way: taking the two 
acres that is located underneath the improvements am! 
facilities, in my opinion that was worth $12,500.00 an 
acre. And that left a remainder of 4.27 acres, and in m1 
opinion that was worth 45 hundred per acre. Making a 
total of $44,215.00." ( T .R. 399.) 
II. Jerome H. Mooney: 
"Q. What is the value which you attribute to the 
land? 
A. $54,000.00. 
Q. And further on there you refer to two acres and 
four acres. To which property does the two acre refer· 
ence refer? 
A. The two-plus acres is the property where the im· 
provements are situated directly under the improve· 
ments. The four-plus would be the remainder of the suo· 
ject property. 
Q. And what value did you ascribe to the two-acrr 
parcel? 
6 
A. $13,000.00 per acre." (T.R. 508.) 
On cross examination this witness further testified 
as follows: 
"Q. You subscribe two acres of land, I believe, in 
your testimony, to the subject development. Did you 
survey this to determine the two acres, or how did you 
arrive at the two acres? 
A. I computed it from the engineer's certificate. 
Q. In what manner did you compute it? 
A. By putting the subject property on top of the 
engineer's survey and measuring the part that was cov-
ered, and computing it mathematically. 
Q. Now, what distance along the front did you uti-
lize for the subject property? 
A. I used a figure of about 650 feet. 
Q. About 650 feet? 
A. Of 650 feet. 
Q. All right. What depth did you allocate to it? 
A. 150 feet. 
Q. And is that the area that you ascribed to the im-
provements? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the subject development? And have you 
multiplied that out to see what acreage it gives you? 
7 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what does it give you? 
A. 97,500 feet." (T.R. 523, 524.) 
III. Werner Keipe. 
} 
r 
a 
"Q. The next step, then, is to, under your, under c 
Exhibit 31, is to take out from that $7,800.00 the incom1 
that is attributable to the land under the improvementl 
is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Why do you want to do that in this capitaliza. 
tion approach? 
A. The-it is necessary to set up depreciation or 
reserve for the recapture of capital in improvementl 
Land itself can be capitalized in perpetuity, but improve· 
ments have to be appraised as to having a physical eco· 
nomic life. And so we separate the two. And this is whal 
r ve done here. 
Now, the value of $45,500.00 ascribed to land is for 
the land which is in the area of the development. It woull 
be the area which is below the old road, the old roal 
which runs along the upper side of the property. And! 
have capitalized that land at 8 % . In other words, I feel 
that an investor is entitled to 8 % net on the value of hii 
land.*** 
Q. What part of-how did you arrive at that, ~fr 
8 
Keipe? Tell us what land you evaluated, at different 
rates. 
A. I divided the land into three parcels. I ascribed 
a value of $25,000.00 for this developed commercial, 
area; I ascribed a value of $2500.00 per acre for the ad-
joining land which lies immediately above it; and I as-
le1 cribed a value of $1,000.00 an acre for this idle land over 
m here, lying to the west." (T.R. 585, 586.) 
On cross examination, this witness further testified 
as follows: 
"Q. And do you think that the use of this property 
:a· 
beyond the property line, and out in the highway, being 
used as a parking, would diminish what a buyer might 
m pay for the property? 
A.No. 
~o· Q. So that in your appraisal, you took into account, 
1ai in arriving at your value, the fact that this land was avail-
able for parking. And I speak now of the land located 
out in the highway, in gray. 
'or 
1
)1 A. Well, only to the degree in which other cars are 
al used in other locations on public streets. But this prop-
!! erty has a lot of land. And the question of parking is 
~el not an important one, because of the VMt amount of land 
nii which they have unused at the present time." (TR. 776). 
The plaintiff called as an expert witness, Gregory 
[I. Austin. This witness significantly based his testimony 
9 
upon the assumption that there was 1.33 acres of lana 
which contributed to the commercial development ana 
.42 acre had been expropriated for highway con.~ 
struction. He further testified that the remaining land 
which he referred to as the "back land" had the same 
before and after value. (T.R. 631, 632, 666, 667; Plain-
tiff's Exhibits 33 & 36) . 
The witness, Austin, further testified that the sub- · 
ject properties had a before value of $57,000.00 (round· 
ed figure) and an after value of $22,500.00, resulting 
in a total award of $34,500.00 for the take and damage. 
(T.R. 632, 667, 685). 
i 
The witnesses testifying for the landowners with I 
respect to damage and compensation utilized various 
combinations of approaches, and their respective tesli· 
monies in that regard may be summarized as follows: 
The witness Marcellus Palmer, under the income 
approach, testified that the property in its before con· 
dition had a value of $89,671.00. (T.R. 399.) By hii 
"cost replacement approach," he testified that the prop· 
erty in its before condition had a total value of $93,· 
167.00. (T.R. 402). 
The witness further testified that he placed primary 
emphasis upon the income approach and determined 
the fair market value of the property in its before con· 
dition to be $89,700.00. (T.R. 402), and that the total 
value of the land and improvements in the after con· 
10 
I dition was $9,809.00 (T.R. 418, Defendants' Exhibit 
I #24-A) thereby ascribing a difference between the be-
, fore and after value of $79,900.00 as the amount to be 
awarded as compensation for the taking and severance 
, damage ( T .R. 422, 423). 
The defendants called as their second expert wit-
ness Mr. Jerome H. Mooney, who testified that the 
fair market value of the subject property on the date 
of taking, in the before condition, was $92,349.00 (T.R. 
,512, Defendants' Exhibit #29). 
The witness further testified that in his opinion the 
fair market value of the property in the after condition 
was $9,341.00 (T.R. 516), resulting in a total differ-
ence for take and severance of $83,008.00 (T.R. 521, 
Defendants' Exhibit #29). 
The third expert witness called by the defendant 
landowners was Werner Keipe, who testified that in 
his opinion the fair market value of the subject prop-
erties in the before condition and as of the date of taking 
was the sum of $90,000.00 ( T .R. 594, Defendants' 
Exhibit #31). 
The witness further testified that the value of the 
subject properties in the after condition on the date of 
taking was the sum of $11,600.00 (T.R. 601, Defend-
ants' Exhibit #31-A), giving a difference in the before 
and after value of $78,400.00. (T.R. 604, Defendants' 
Exhibit #31-B). 
11 
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial jud~I 
entered judgment in favor of the defendant landowneN! 
and against the plaintiff in the principal sum of $65,. 
992.00, computed in the following manner: 
(a) Fair market value of 6.27 acres 
before condemnation ................................ $80,70U 
(b) Fair market value of remainder 
5.85 acres after condemnation ................ $14,709.0~ 
I 
TOTAL DAMAGES ............................ $65,992.001 
Following the decision of this court in case no. 1186~. 
the case was remanded to the trial judge with instruc· 
tions to eliminate from his Findings and Judgment ~ 
I 
severance damages awarded for the "non-owned land"i 
if he could do so; otherwise, a new trial was ordered 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated April 
1969, Decision in case no. 11866, Utah Supreme Court). 
After additional argument of counsel, the trial 
court ordered the entry of Amended Findings of Fae!, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, wherein the said 
trial court found as follows: 
(a) Fair market value of the total 
tract of 1.33 acres in the before condition $70,821.0~ 
(b) Fair market value of the remaider 
.97 (sic. 96) acre remaining after con-
demnation .................................................. $10,629.0~ 
TOTAL AWARD FOR DAMAGE 
12 
AND TAKING .................................... $60,192.00 
(Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment, dated March 1971) 
POINTS 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FINDING THAT SEVERANCE DAMAGES TO 
THE "NON-OWNED" LAND COULD BE 
ELIMINATED FROM THE FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT. 
POINT II. THAT DEFENDANT LANDOWN-
ERS HAVE FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF RELATIVE TO COM-
PENSATION AND DAMAGES CAUSED BY 
THE TAKING. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FINDING THAT SEVERANCE DAMAGES TO 
THE "NON-OWNED" LAND COULD BE 
ELIMINATED FROM THE FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT. 
In view of the trial court's ruling that the defendant 
land owners were the owners of 6.27 acres of real prop-
13 
erty in the before condition, the three expert witnes~e c 
called by the defendants based their before and aftt 
1 
values upon that particular ownership. Of great sii t 
nificance is the fact that each of the defendants' exper 
witnesses concluded and testified that in their opinio1 
there was in excess of 1.33 acres of land devoted ani I 
used for the commercial development located upon tn1 J 
premises. In this regard, the witness, Keipe, testifo < 
that in his opinion 1.82 acres were devoted to the com i 
mercial development. The witness, :Marcellus Palmer 
testified that in his opinion two acres were devoted 1, 
the commercial development, and the witness, J erorn1 
H. Mooney, testified that in his opinion a little mon 
than two acres were devoted to the commercial develo~ 
ment. All of these assumptions were contrary to tn1 
law announced by this court in its decision in case no 
11866. The only witness who testified with respect !1 
the true acreage was the witness of the plaintiff, M1 ' 
Gregory Austin, who utilized a total acreage of U · 
as the basis for the commercial development. The 11 
spective significant testimonies referred to are set fortt 
in the Statement of Facts heretofore. 
'Ve are now confronted with the problem o 
determining what credence can be given to the tes~ 
mony of those witnesses who predicated their exper 
opinion evidence, and testimony upon an erroneoui 
assumption of fact and law. It is the contention of tf: 
P
laintiff that such evidence and testimony must fall~· 
• n 
a matter of law, and by reason thereof, there is · 
14 
~e credible evidence of any probative value before the court 
lt upon (which) a Finding of Fact can be based to support 
ii the Judgment and award made by the trial court. 
er 
01 In the landmark case of United States vs. Honn-
ni [ulu Plantation Company, 182 Fed. 2d 172 (9th Circuit 
11 1950) , the Court there addressed itself to the matter 
1~ of expert testimony based upon erroneous assumptions 
m· and noted: 
er 
]t 
)~ 
lli 
"Where unwarranted theories of law or assump-
tions of fact guide the expert and are used as a 
basis for value by the Court, the evaluation will 
be set aside and cause remanded for new Find-
ings." 
10 In the case of State of Washington vs. United States, 
11 214 Fed. 2d 33 (9th Circuit 1954), there existed a dis-
fr crepancy between the physical facts and the opinion 
~ of the expert witness. In that case, the Court observed 
r1 that: 
:tt 
i~ 
er 
"Opinion evid~nce is only .a~ go~ as th~ facts 
upon which it is based. Opn~10n evidence m c~n­
flict with physical facts, U mted States vs. Hill, 
8th Cir., 1933, 62 Fed. 2d 1022; United States 
vs. Thornburgh,sth Cir., 1940, lll Fed. 2d 2~8, 
280, is not substantial evidence and may be dis-
regarded." 
"***Evidence contradicted by the physical facts 
is entitled to no credence." (Numerous authori-
ties cited.) 
15 
Although the Washington case, supra, is dea\inc 
with a conflict between physical facts and expe; 
opinions, we see no difference between that situatio: 
and one where there is a conflict between a princip\i 
of law and expert opinion. Thus, it would seem to wi 
that if the expert opinion testimony is in direct conili1: 
with a legal concept or principle, then and in that event 
the testimony would be entitled to no credence what! 
soever under the authorities set forth. I 
A further case of significance is the case of 681&: 
acres of land, etc., Rio Arriba Co., N. M. vs. Unit~ 
States, 411 Fed. 2d 834 (10th Cir. 1969) which sef 
forth the following: 
"To have probative value, expert opinion mm 
be 'founded upon substantial data, not mere cm 
jecture, speculation or unwarranted assumptim 
It must have a rational foundation.' United Stalt 
vs. Sowards, 370 Fed. 2d 87, 92 (10th Cir. 1960! 
Here the government experts relied on erroneou 
legal. assumptions, made no attempt to. s~eci~ 
the kmd of benefit contemplated or to hm1t n1 
amount of acreage to be benefited. Surely thee1 
tire 26,000 remaining acres will not be useful 11i 
lakeshore development and will not be benefit~ 
Yet, the government experts did not explain tb11 
gross valuation or denominate the extent of~ 
benefit in any way. Obviously, such 'speculati;i 
and remote possibilities cannot become a gU11 
for the ascertainment of value in judicial asct: 
tainment of the truth.'" (Authorities cited.) 
In the case of United States vs. 102.93 acres' 
16 
n1 land, 154 Fed. Supp. 258 (United States District Court, 
ir New York, July 1957) the Court said: 
I 
1at
1 
I 
"* * * Opinion evidence is only as good as the 
facts upon which it is based. ' ' ' Where unwar-
ranted theories of law or assumptions of fact 
guide the experts and are used as a basis for value 
by the Court, the valuation will be set aside and 
the cause remanded for new Findinus." (Author-
ities cited.) (Emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court of California in the case of 
o.: Metropolitan Water District vs. Adams, 116 P.2d 7, 
t~ quoting from the case of City of Stockton vs. Billing-
~ 1 ·, wood, 96 Ca . App. at Page 722, said: 
i 
:or 
im 
1\t 
10! 
·ou 
ci~ 
I 
H1 
e1 
111 
I w 
hf] 
I 
"The rule which requires the rejection of testi-
mony evaluating remote, conjectural, speculative, 
and hypothetical uses and elements is of long 
standing." 
"* * * \Vhere a witness testifying as to value, 
bases his opinion entirely upon incompetent and 
inadmissable matters, or shows that such matters 
are cheap elements in the calculations which lead 
to his conclusion, his testimony should be rejected. 
This applies with great force where the opinion 
is based upon pure speculation. * * *" 
~ In the case of State Highway Commission vs. 
~;i Central Paving Co., 399 P.2d 1019, 240 Oregon 71, the 
;cf Court in discussing the credibility of testimony based 
in part on an element improperly employed stated: 
~S' "* * * However, if the estimate is based in part 
17 
upon an element improperly employed, the esh, 11 
ma~e is not. competent evidence and the Stateti6 
entitled to mquire as to the value attributed ti j' 
the improperly employed element for the pur .i 
pose of reducing the estimate by that amount, 01 m 
if it cannot be segregated, to insist that the wit. w 
ness' s estimate be stricken. Therefore, the judK UJ 
ment must be reversed and the cause remande( f 
f . l" f or a new tria . 
oJ 
See also: United States vs. Cooper (5th Cir. 196ij1lr 
277 Fed. 2d 857; International Paper Co. vs. Unite,,u1 
States, 227 Fed. 2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955). ·1''1 
'fc 
In the case of United States vs. Smith, 355 F.i~ tr 
807 (5th Cir. 1966), the trial court permitted a witnfl! !1 
to utilize Option Agreements as comparable sales t1 in 
support his testimony, which the Appellate Court heli le 
to be error ; and in reversing the trial court and orderi~ P1 
a new trial, the court said: 
"* * * Without that testimony the amount of tn1 d1 
verdict was much above the range of the com ai 
petent evidence of the expert witnesses and of t11 
comparable transactions which were in evidencf m 
Under these circumstances it would be impossibl1 to 
to say that the jury did not base its verdict, i ei 
least in part, upon Williamson's incompeten w 
t~stimony. It foll~ws that t?e Gov~rnmen~ is efr ol 
titled to a new tnal at which the Jury will haf 
only competent evidence of market value befor 
it." 
\V 
Each of the expert witnesses of the def endan di 
landowners predicated their testimony upon unwar 
18 
sh, ranted assumptions of fact and law, i.e., that there existed 
~ti 6.27 acres of land in the original tract owned by the de-
li J'endant landowners at the time of and prior to the tak-
: ing, and that of said amount approximately two acres 
vii· were devoted to the commercial development located 
lK upon the premises, when in truth and in fact the said de-
le( fendant landowners were the owners of only 1.33 acres 
of land, and the subject improvements were located, by 
rn
1 
the testimony of the defendants' witnesses, not only 
tel, upon the 1.33 acres of land but upon the adjoining 
i ''non-owned" properties. Considered in the light of the 
'foregoing authorities, it seems patently clear to us that 
.i~ the assumptions made by these witnesses leave their 
.el! testimony without any probative value or foundation 
t1 in fact, and in any event, would not support a finding 
eli for Judgment in the amount found to be due as com-
i~ pensation for the taking and damages sustained. 
If the testimony of the expert witnesses for the 
tni defendant landowners was in fact unworthy of belief 
ili and not entitled to stand as credible evidence or testi-
tcf mony, then and in that event there would be no basis 
.bl1 to support the Findings of the trial court, save and 
1 except the testimony of the State's witness which sum 
en was far less than the amount awarded by the Judgment 
e& 
af of the trial court. 
or 
It seems patently clear that there is no way by 
an which the court, under the present posture of the evi-
dence and testimonv can now segregate the severance 
t J ' 
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damages from the "non-owned land." The entire testi. 
many of the expert witnesses for the defendant land. 
owners is so interwoven and founded upon a unit at 
6.27 acres, and unwarranted assumptions of law ano 
fact, that it defies any reasonable segregation of the 
non-owned land. 'Vithout the opportunity to examine 
the witnesses based upon the true ownership, it seem~ 
that the plaintiff would be severly prejudiced by any 
Judgment of the trial court, except a Judgment predi. 
cated solely upon the evidence and testimony eliciteo 
from the State's witness Gregory Austin, the only wit· 
ness who utilized the true acreage of 1.33 acres anu 
ascribed no difference to the non-owned land in the 
before and after condition. 
POINT II. THAT DEFENDANT LANDOWN· 
ERS HAVE FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF RELATIVE TO COM· 
PENSATION AND DAMAGES CAUSED EY 
THE TAKING. 
. I 
The rule of law is well established in this jurisd1c· 
tion that in an action in eminent domain the landowner 
has the burden of proof to establish, by competen1
1 
evidence, his right to compensation for taking an~! 
severance damages, if any. See: Tanner vs. Proru 
Bench Canal and Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 P 
584 (1911); People vs. Thomas, 239 P.2d 914 (Call 
1952); State of Idaho vs. Dunclick, 286 P.2d lll!i 
20 
ti. (1955); State vs. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 P.2d 
d. 76 (1961); Utah Road Commission vs. Hanson, 14 
Dt Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963). 
10 
le In the case of United States of America vs. Sowards, 
Je 370 Fed. 2d 87 (10th Cir. 1966), the Court said: 
n~ 
l)' 
Ii· 
~o 
ii· 
10 
ne 
"* * * The burden rests upon the owner to estab-
lish by competent evidence his right to substantial 
compensation." (Cages and authorities cited.) 
"Qualified and knowledgable witnesses may give 
their opinion or estimate of the value of the prop-
erty taken, but to have probative value, that opin-
ion or estimate must be founded upon substantial 
data, not mere conjecture, speculation, or unwar-
ranted assumption. It must have a rational foun-
dation." (Authorities cited.) (Emphasis added.) 
Of similar import is the case of United States vs. 
~· 765.56 acres of land, 164 Fed. Supp. 942 (United States 
E District Court of New York, July 1958) where the 
1!· court said: 
y 
IC· 
1€! 
"* * * It appears clear from his testimony that 
his appraisals and estimates of damage are large-
ly, if not entirely, based upon unwarranted and 
unjustified theories of law and assumptions of 
fact and, as such must be completely rejected by 
the court." (Authorities cited.) 
"The burden of proof rested upon the owners and 
not upon the government to establish the damage 
sustained as a result of the easement taken, by a 
fair preponderance of the evidence, and upon 
opinion having a rational foundation." (Authori-
ties cited.) 
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It is the position of the plaintiff that the testimony , 
of the expert witnesses for the defendant landowner1 
have predicated their entire testimony upon unwar. I 
ranted assumptions of law and fact. Therefore, the 
entire testimony must fail and be totally rejected b) 
the trial court. The landowners having failed to sustain 
the burden of proof, the only alternative is for the trial 
court to enter judgment for the defendant landownen 
predicated upon the testimony and evidence of the I 
State's witness, or in the alternative, order a new trial 1 
based upon a reappraisal of the property founded upon I 
the correct ownership of the properties involved in the 1 
subject actions. I 
In the Memorandum Decision of January 25, 1971, 1 
the trial court referred to the testimony of the State'1 ' 
appraiser, Gregory Austin, to support its finding that 1 
$5,800.00 was the amount awarded for severance dam-
age to the "non-owned" land. The trial court further ' 
observed that said witness determined that the "non· ' 
owned" land was worth $2,000.00 per acre in both the I 
before and after condition. Mr. Austin was the om~ 1 
witness to approach the appraisal of the subject prop· 1 
erty in this manner. The crux of the problem lies in 
1 
the fact that there was no evidence or testimony to 
1 
support the judgment of $60,192.00 without utilizini ; 
the testimony of expert witnesses for the defendants. 
I 
When we consider that the testimonies of these I 
witnesses were founded on unwarranted assumptioDI 
1 
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ny the burden of proof placed upon the defendants has not 
~r1 been met, and the sole credible testimony of any pro-
lr· bative value is that of the State's witness. 
he 
b) 
l!Il 
ial 
CONCLUSION 
:n In essence, it is the position of the plaintiff, that 
he by virtue of the trial court's erroneous ruling with 
ial respect to the true ownership of the lands in question, 
on the plaintiff and the court were thereby deprived of the 
he opportunity, on cross examination, of determining and 
testing the reasoning, method and amount for severance 
damages attributed to any "non-owned" land in excess 
r1
1 
of 1.33 acres. It is significant to note that the expert 
e'1 witnesses for defendants based their testimony upon the 
1at erroneous assumption that at least 1.82 acres of the 
11• subject property devoted to a commercial development 
ier was owned by the defendants, and the greatest damage 
in· was assigned to the commercial area. It would be of 
he great interest to know what these witnesses would have 
U\ testified to had their testimony been confined to the 
1
;. true ownership of 1.33 acres. Each of them testified 
in to the effect, that although only 1.82 acres or two acres 
to of the subject property was devoted to the commercial 
ni development, nevertheless, the fact that the landowners 
1. natl access to a remaining larger tract would, in their 
opinion, substantially lend itself to a development of the 
~e property into a larger operation. To what extent this 
01 rnav have influenced their overall appraisal can only 
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be the subject of pure speculation and conjecture at 
this time. However, in view of the trial court's erroneou1 
ruling with respect to the ownership, there is no logical 
or feasible method by which the severance damage! 
attributed by defendant's witnesses can now be allocatea 
to the 1.33 acres of owned land and separated from th1 
"non-owned" land. 
It is the plaintiff's position that the burden o! 
proof has not been sustained by defendants by reasou 
of the unsupported and unfounded testimony of theil 
expert witnesses. This being so, the trial court is then 
left with only one source of credible evidence for ib 
consideration in a determination of the issues involvea, 
i.e., the testimony of Gregory Austin, appraiser for th1 
plaintiff. With this testimony being the sole credibl< 
evidence for the court to consider, we respectfully submit 
that there is no logical basis upon which the trial court 
could predicate an appropriate Finding of Fact ano 
Judgment, save and except one based upon the testi· 
mony of said witness. Accordingly, we contend that 
the only judgment which could be entered by the trial 
court would have to be founded upon the testimony ol 
such witness, or that a new trial be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
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State of Utah 
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Special Assistant Attorney General 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
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